Reading through published books, news reports, web logs, and forum discussions in China, one finds that most of the well-intentioned discourses that take peasants as their subject are imbued with a sense of wenti (problem). Since economist Wen Tiejun in 1987 first launched the sannong wenti (three-nong problem) in his book, referring to "the three-dimensions" of "the rural issue," he was speaking of, first, nongcun (rural areas), second, nongye (agricultural production), and third, nongmin (rural people). His analysis in particular made the three-nong problem (sannong wenti) a catchphrase that has been widely used in government policies and media treatments. 1 In particular, among the three "nongs," the problem of the rural people (nongmin) has usually been seen as the most crucial issue. This is not to say that there has not been a certain concern for the well-being of rural people. However, attention to them tends to be expressed in statements about national welpositions 22:3
they have only temporary residence permits. The term floating population (liudong renkou) thus emerged in the reform era as a generic term for an emergent major group within the Chinese population. Those who migrate for work, or dagong, regardless of where they come from or go to, are essentially defined as rural people. 6 This "floating population," being away from their registered home place, often cannot get any local governmental protection in their workplace, nor do they qualify for most social services, and they tend to be treated by the local urbanites as "second-class citizens" 二等公民 . 7 Migrant laborers have thus become a "new lumpen proletariat," forming a stark contrast to the new urban bourgeois elite who support the world's most rapidly growing market in luxury goods. 8 Further, as Zhang Li (author of Strangers in the City) points out, more and more peasants have poured into towns and cities, where they have come to be regarded as a social problem despite their enormous economic contributions. 9 Like the stigmatizing term blind flow (mangliu 盲流), first used in the early 1950s to describe the peasants who moved to cities, the term floating population, despite its wide range of applicability in so many parts of China, in practice is little more than a subcategory of the generic term nongmin.
On top of the legally institutionalized urban-rural divide, there is now a market-oriented perceived urban-rural discrepancy that refers to an increasing gap in personal standards and ways of living in urban and rural areas. 10 The impact of what is now thought of as increasing cultural and even bodily difference between town and country can run very deep. Even in some of the most prominent social-policy contexts, and certainly in popular urban conversation, villagers tend to be thought of as having no culture, needing contact with urban life to be able to learn to consume wisely and work rationally, unable to manage their natural and social environment well, and so forth. Living with this divide, "rural" bodies continue to be deeply inscribed by national and transnational discourses on "the peasant." These discourses systematically reduce diverse conditions into the characteristics of generalized objects, at the same time disguising polemical judgments as natural facts. 11 In particular, hegemonic elite discourses (those of urbanites, intellectuals, government officials, etc.) tend to produce a generic nongmin (peasant) at the level of image and language, contextualized in a condescending rep-resentation of life in the countryside. This way of reducing heterogeneous rural lives to a monotone level of low development is consistent with the arbitrary state regulatory regime that, in a sense, has no choice but to function on an abstract "national" level and thus, for any given rural situation, is always only partial. If one wanted to make an effective intervention in these arbitrary state regulations, which as we know can change and are always changing, then a necessary step would be to not "see like a state" but to take into consideration the interactions of abstract and standardized government policy as it articulates (or not) with discordant local conditions, which are particular, concrete, and diverse. 12 On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that rural life in China is not necessarily centered on the state or even the new government policy (2005) mandating the development of "a new countryside."
It is with these considerations of the politics of knowledge surrounding research on rural society in China that I started to gather contributions to this special issue. All these articles, in a variety of ways, bring into visibility the heterogeneity of life in the countryside. Only with much richer forms of social-science representation, sensitive to "local conditions," can we begin to penetrate and address China's problematic rural-urban divide. Ethnography and field sociology are especially good ways of overcoming such stereotypes and of delivering more nuanced and diverse understandings of China's many forms of modernity. These kinds of research also require and invite comparison of China's "ruralities," whatever those might be, with other situations around the world in which "peasants" might still be presented as a chronic problem.
One of the primary stereotypes seen in world journalism about China is the fabled monolithic or even totalitarian strength of the Chinese state. Destabilizing this image, the articles gathered here all contribute to an anthropology or sociology of the state as it is seen from the point of view of its relatively denigrated or subaltern peripheries, that is, rural China. The "state" with which people are in dialogue at the grassroots level is quite heterogeneous, and its powers are limited, contingent, tentative, even anxious. In this issue, for example, the secular imperatives of state policies against religious "superstition" are dealt with -in Gao Bingzhong's narration of how a temple fair successfully worked itself into the official discourse of intangible cultural heritage -by means of a "double naming" strategy. And villagers in Mikkel Bunkenborg's article deal with state imperatives by erecting a parallel government in the cosmological dimension. Ying Xing's study of barefoot lawyers, further, reflects the construction of a zone of negotiation between federal legal regulation and local interests, as does Anna LoraWainwright's story of villagers' simultaneous exploiting and being exploited by government agencies (among others). Lili Lai and Zhu Xiaoyang report the often unfortunate consequences of an unquestioning commitment to vast state programs of modernization and development, and Li Li's article examines the relationship between central "government" concerns with cultural heritage and local appropriations of "heritage," as they function in the domain of knowledge about the nation. Taken together, these articles document and analyze the penetration of the Chinese state into everyday lives and ordinary desires, as well as the many techniques by which people at the most local level in China construct a state interlocutor even as they work on the rich and heterogeneous cultural character of their local communities.
Allied to this, these articles demonstrate our anthropological appreciation of the fact that, despite what urbanites might think, "even villages have culture." The richness and complexity of what I have elsewhere called "immanent sociality" -or everyday interdependence -and local senses of history and cosmic situation persuade us that there is nothing "backward" about villages; 13 simply the appreciative description of village and township cultural activism and heritage curation is a contribution, one that can function to challenge the pervasive developmentalism of the state, a vast policy environment that is criticized in Zhu Xiaoyang's discussion of land appropriation in Yunnan.
Also, analyses made by Lili Lai and Anna Lora-Wainwright have shown that the description of rural people as victims of official policies (or failures to govern well, for that matter) is double-edged. The victims of poverty are often blamed for naturally producing the miserable conditions in which they are forced to live; at the same time, they may find ways to turn the status of victim to good political account by demanding the responsible government that has always been promised. Along these lines, Zhu Xiaoyang takes issue with what he calls a "Scottian approach" to resistance. Once anthropologists start reexamining the idea that "where there is power there is resistance" -an idea that has led scholars since Michel Foucault to look for many forms of power and numerous nonobvious forms of resistance -both terms are subject to empirical examination. In other words, both rural activism and apparent rural passivity, in different cases, when better understood in local historical contexts, give a specific historical character to "resistance" and to the political. Standard categories of the political no longer predict what struggles on the ground, in the countryside, and in migrant enclaves will be.
This has been shown explicitly in the articles gathered here: Villagers in Gao Bingzhong's article resist secularizing policy by reviving their Dragon Tablet cult even as they denature its cosmic force with a harmless-looking museum project. Mikkel Bunkenborg's research subjects bypass state demands for a "culturalizing" of "religious heritage" by quietly building a governmentality that is cosmic in origin. Ying Xing's barefoot lawyers refuse the authorized marketization of legal rights by forming a cooperative legal-services exchange with their neighbors and fellow townspeople. Lili Lai's Henan villagers do their best, in the absence of a waste-management infrastructure, to control public waste, but they have no choice but to prioritize their own hygiene and health, thus complying with rather than resisting a political economy that treats the countryside as a dump. Villagers whose houses and land are under threat from development, in Anna Lora-Wainwright and Zhu Xiaoyang's field sites, fight government corruption with personal stratagems even as they "reconfigure their local moral universe" and mobilize their "local knowledge" in a conflicted social life. Li Li's heritage curation projects give us perhaps the most nuanced picture of interwoven resistance and compliance as people assert local culture both against and within the expectations of the state.
All these studies are ethnographic. The theoretical resources that they engage tend to be from anthropology or sociology. One could ask to what extent they are critical or engaged vis-à-vis Chinese developmental politics, or challenge their contribution to social theory. But here we also consider how sympathetic description and interpretation of diverse rural conditions might itself bring about cultural and social change. Certainly, the Chinese authors in this issue see their field research and appreciative accounts of rural situations and initiatives as a form of engagement and critical com-mentary. The political contingency of rural cultural production is also highlighted by Lora-Wainwright and Bunkenborg. Field research rescues complexity from overgeneralizing policy-oriented research; these articles give us such diverse conditions in China that it becomes impossible to sustain simplistic dualities such as rural and urban. This is in itself critique.
